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On January 21, 2021, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) issued its
judgment in the interstate case of Georgia v. Russia (II).2 Georgia complained that Russia
committed systemic human rights violations in the course of the 2008 war in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both of these regions are de jure parts of Georgia, but they have not
been effectively governed by central Georgian authorities since the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991. During the night of August 7–8, 2008, Georgian artillery attacked
Tskhinvali (the administrative capital of South Ossetia). Russian forces entered South
Ossetia and Abkhazia the next day. Russian and Georgian troops engaged in hostilities for
five days, before agreeing a ceasefire on August 12, 2008. Since then, a significant military
contingent of Russian troops has remained in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Georgian
authorities complained of systemic violations of European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture), 5 (right to liberty), and 8
(right to privacy), ECHR Protocol 1 Articles 1 (right to private property) and 2 (right to edu-
cation), and ECHR Protocol 4 Article 2 (Freedom of movement).
The Court first considered whether the respondent state had jurisdiction over the territory
where violations were taking place. Second, if the respondent state did execute its jurisdiction,
whether it had committed any violations of the Convention.
Regarding jurisdiction, the Court decided to divide the period of conflict into an active
hostilities phase (August 8–12, 2008) and the subsequent events. One of the most significant
and controversial findings of this judgment is that Russia had no jurisdiction over the territory
of the conflict during the initial shooting war. The Court considered two grounds of jurisdic-
tion here: effective control over the territory3 and “state agent authority or control over individu-
als.”4 In other words, the ECtHR used both territorial and personal control as the grounds of
jurisdiction.5
The ECtHR found no jurisdictional basis grounded in Russia’s effective control of South
Ossetian and Abkhazian territory during the active hostilities phase. In its words:
In the event of military operations—including, for example, armed attacks, bombing or
shelling—carried out during an international armed conflict one cannot generally speak
of “effective control” over an area. The very reality of armed confrontation and fighting
between enemy military forces seeking to establish control over an area in a context of
chaos means that there is no control over an area. (Para. 126).
1 I thank Andrew Forde for his helpful comments on the previous drafts of this case note. Usual disclaimers
apply.
2 Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], Merits, App. No. 38263/08 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Jan. 21, 2021).
3 See Loizidou v. Turkey, Merits, App. No. 15318/89, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 18, 1996).
4 Issa and Others v. Turkey, Merits, App. No. 31821/96, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 629, para. 71 (Eur. Ct. Hum.
Rts. Nov. 16, 2004).
5 See Samantha Besson, The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights
Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 857, 874–76 (2012).
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The Court thus concluded that a war zone creates a situation of chaos, in which it is hardly
possible to talk about effective control.
The ECtHR then considered whether jurisdiction could be established during the period of
active hostilities on the basis of “State agent authority and control over individuals” (para.
127). The Court acknowledged that it had confirmed the contracting parties’ jurisdiction
in comparable situations in the past, but distinguished prior cases as involving “isolated
and specific acts” (para. 132).6 The Court maintained that the scale of the hostilities in
Georgia v. Russia (II) prevented it from establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction of the respon-
dent state on this ground:
Having regard in particular to the large number of alleged victims and contested inci-
dents, the magnitude of the evidence produced, the difficulty in establishing the relevant
circumstances and the fact that such situations are predominantly regulated by legal
norms other than those of the Convention (specifically, international humanitarian
law or the law of armed conflict), the Court considers that it is not in a position to develop
its case-law beyond the understanding of the notion of “jurisdiction” as established to
date. (Para. 141).
The Court thus decided that the respondent state did not have jurisdiction over the territory
of hostilities between August 8–12, 2008.Writing in concurrence, Judge Keller tried to elab-
orate on this barebones reasoning:
Had the Court held otherwise as to the question of jurisdiction during the active phase of
hostilities, its duty would have been to assess the conduct of the respondent State in terms
of international humanitarian law in order to resolve the applicant Government’s com-
plaint under Article 2. (Concurring op., Keller, J., para. 25).
It seems that the ECtHR wanted to make a clear distinction between international human
rights law and international humanitarian law—a distinction that this very Court has been
blurring for years.7
Although the Court did not establish Russia’s jurisdiction over the disputed territory dur-
ing the hostilities, this did not absolve Russia from all human rights violations stemming from
the events taking place between August 8–12, 2008. The Court confirmed Russia’s obliga-
tion to investigate deaths even if they occurred during the hostilities for three reasons (para.
331). First, in its view, the Russian authorities took “steps to investigate” these deaths, thereby
assuming an obligation to investigate (id.). Second, the Court found that Russian authorities
did exercise effective control over the relevant Georgian territory after August 12. And third,
“all the potential suspects among the Russian service personnel were located either in the
Russian Federation or in territories under the control of the Russian Federation” (id.). The
6 See Issa and Others v. Turkey, supra note 4; Solomou and Others v. Turkey, Judgment, App. No. 36832/97
(Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. June 24, 2008). For more on the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence, see Marko
Milanović & Tatjana Papić, Makuchyan and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary, 115 AJIL 294 (2021).
7 SeeHassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], Judgment, App. No. 29750/09, 2014 ECHR (Sept. 16, 2014); Al-
Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], Judgment, App. No. 55721/07, 2011 ECHR (July 7, 2011);
Jaloud v. The Netherlands [GC], Judgment, App. No. 47708/08, 2014 ECHR (Nov. 20, 2014). See also STUART
WALLACE, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO MILITARY OPERATIONS (2019)
(especially Chapter 5).
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Court also found that Russia had jurisdiction over the territories even between August 8–12,
2008, and that it is liable for its alleged arbitrary detention of civilians contrary to Article 5 of
the Convention (paras. 238–39). The Court did not explain its decision here, simply stating
that “[i]n so far as the Georgian civilians were mostly detained after the hostilities had ceased,
the Court concludes that they fell within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation within the
meaning of Article 1 of the Convention” (para. 239).
For the period after active hostilities subsided (August 12–October 10, 20088), the ECtHR
confirmed Russian authorities’ “effective control” over South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and the
“buffer zone.” The Court pointed to Russia’s substantial military presence, as well as its mil-
itary, economic, and political support of its allies in these regions.
After establishing Russia’s partial jurisdiction over the territories, the Court considered
whether Russian authorities committed systematic breaches of human rights. The ECtHR first
examined whether the killings, ill-treatment, and looting and burning of homes had been carried
out by Russian and South Ossetian armed forces in South Ossetia and the adjacent buffer zone.
The ECtHR arranged a fact-finding mission to answer this and other substantive questions rel-
evant to the merits of this case—a rarity in the Court’s practice. Concurring Judge Keller, how-
ever, expressed her dissatisfaction with the scale of the fact-finding mission, pointing out that
“the Court’s usual fact-finding methodology is ill-suited, in its flexibility and forbearance, to
inter-State cases” (concurring op., Keller, J., para. 11). Despite such criticism, the Court relied
on witness statements as well as various reports and decisions by international organizations and
NGOs in order to establish an administrative practice of killing, destruction of homes, and ill-
treatment. The Court emphasized that this practice was demonstrated by both the “repetition of
acts” and “official tolerance” of the authorities (para. 216). The Court came to a similar con-
clusion in relation to arbitrary detention and ill-treatment of arrested civilians (mostly women
and elderly people) (paras. 242–56), and ill-treatment of Georgian prisoners of war (paras.
271–81). It also found that Russia had engaged in an administrative practice of violating
the freedom of movement of displaced persons contrary to Article 2 of ECHR Protocol 4,
and that Russian authorities failed to investigate deaths that happened during and after the
war (paras. 296–301).
In its decision on the merits, the ECtHR did not distinguish between the Russian and local
(for example, South Ossetian) troops:
Even if the direct participation of the Russian forces has not been clearly demonstrated in
all cases, since it has been established that the prisoners of war fell within the jurisdiction
of the Russian Federation on account of the “strict control” that it exercised over the
South Ossetian forces, it was also responsible for the latter’s actions, without it being nec-
essary to provide proof of “detailed control” of each of those actions. (Para. 276).
As a result of this standard, the ECtHR expects the relevant authorities to comply with human
rights as soon as a member state establishes effective control over a territory. The Court did
8 OnOctober 10, 2008, Russia completed the withdrawal of its troops stationed in the “buffer zone” (para. 44).
Since August 22, 2018, another application of Georgia against Russia is pending before the Court. This applica-
tion concerns the deterioration of the human rights situation along the administrative boundary lines between
Georgian-controlled territory and Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia v. Russia (IV), App. No. 39611/18.
European Court of Human Rights Registrar Press Release, New Inter-state Application Brought by Georgia
Against Russia (Aug. 21, 2018), at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i¼003-6176209-8005403.
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not, however, clearly distinguish between attribution and jurisdiction. As rightly noted by
Marko Milanović:
While Russia is being found responsible for an “administrative practice” . . . it is unclear
whether Russia is being held responsible for violating (by action) a negative duty to
respect human rights, or for violating (by omission) a positive duty to prevent third parties
from violating human rights within an area under its jurisdiction.9
This ambiguity makes the question of jurisdiction—rather than attribution—the key battle-
ground between the parties in this and other war-related cases.10
Finally, the Court established that Russian authorities failed to produce military combat
reports regarding the armed conflict in Georgia and other relevant documents. As a result,
the Court found a violation of Article 38 of the Convention, which obliges authorities to furnish
all necessary facilities to the Court in its task of establishing the facts of the case (paras. 341–46).
The judgment includes nine separate opinions. The key point of disagreement between the
majority and minority was whether Russia had jurisdiction during the active phase of hostil-
ities. The dissenting judges attacked the Court’s newly established principle of territorial
jurisdiction during armed conflicts from various angles. Judge Grozev stressed that the rea-
soning of the majority creates an impermissible legal vacuum in Europe wherever a war zone
arises. He questioned why individuals protected by the Convention before August 8, 2008
and after August 12, 2008 were removed from its protection during the intervening days sim-
ply because they found themselves in a war zone (partly diss. op., Grozev, J.). Judges
Yudkivska, Pinto de Albuquerque, Wojtyczek, Lemmens, and Chanturia (in different com-
binations) argued that the majority’s reasoning is inconsistent and ambiguous. For them, the
majority confuses the case law, undermines the Court’s authority, weakens the protection of
the Convention, and runs counter to its spirit. Moreover, for some of the judges in the minor-
ity, the majority did not strike the right balance between international humanitarian law and
international human rights law (joint partly diss. op., Yudkivska, Pinto de Albuquerque,
Chanturia, JJ., para. 24).
* * * *
Georgia v. Russia (II) is a highly ambivalent judgment. It achieves some accountability for
systemic human rights abuses, but at the cost of significant avoidance, compromise, and con-
fusion. This judgment will long resonate for scholars of the ECHR, international humanitar-
ian law, the jurisdiction of international tribunals, and everything in between. It seems that
the majority of the ECtHR aspired to deliver a balanced judgment that offered a partial victory
to both parties while also relieving itself of the need to adjudicate complex cases dealing with
active international armed conflicts. On the one hand, the Court did not find that Russia had
jurisdiction over the active war zone, effectively absolving it from some human rights obliga-
tions between August 8–12, 2008. This was a significant victory for Russian authorities. It
also represents a retreat by the Court from the muddy waters of humanitarian law. On the
9 Marko Milanović, Georgia v. Russia No. 2: The European Court’s Resurrection of Bankovic in the Contexts of
Chaos, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 25, 2021), at https://www.ejiltalk.org/georgia-v-russia-no-2-the-european-courts-resur
rection-of-bankovic-in-the-contexts-of-chaos.
10 For more discussion on attribution and jurisdiction, see Jane M. Rooney, The Relationship Between
Jurisdiction and Attribution After Jaloud v. Netherlands, 62 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 407 (2015).
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other hand, the ECtHR found Russia liable for systemic human rights violations in territory it
controlled after the active period of hostilities—no small victory for Georgia. However, the
judgment confuses the law more than clarifying it. In striving for a (shaky) compromise
involving a complex matter of jurisdiction, the Court reconsidered the recent development
of its case law and left many questions unanswered. This judgment will also have significant
ramifications for the pending cases in which contested jurisdiction during military hostilities
is at stake.
In what follows, I make three brief arguments. First, the standard adopted by the Court is
difficult to apply in practice. Second, the Court is inconsistent in how it applies human rights
law to armed conflicts. Finally, the Court ultimately undermines its key function of human
rights protection by not engaging with the active phase of military conflicts.
Over two thinly reasoned pages, the majority decided that the Convention does not apply
to the active phases of military confrontations. As a result, the ECHR is not applicable when it
is sorely needed. The Court’s reasoning further leaves open many questions of how this inter-
pretation can be applied in practice. Judge Keller argued that the reasoning of the majority
might be appropriate in interstate cases involving active hostilities but not in individual appli-
cations (concurring op., Keller, J., para. 130). However, this approach seems questionable as a
matter of principle.
The accountability gap during the active phase of hostilities is not total, however. The
Court decided that Russia is still under the obligation to investigate deaths even if they hap-
pened before Russia established effective control. It also held Russia responsible for arbitrary
arrests made during the hostilities. The Court’s reasoning here looks like a slice of good Swiss
Emmentaler, in which there are more holes than cheese. This porous accountability might
seem appropriate in the present case, but the Court gives no indication of what it portends for
other cases involving military confrontations. For example, will there be an obligation to
investigate if the territory is not under effective control for a prolonged period of time?
What of accountability during failed ceasefires, as in Nagorno-Karabakh? It is impossible
to predict how the standard would be applied to the situation in Eastern Ukraine, where
Russia is not officially involved and the hostilities have been going on for many years—
and where the degree of activity ebbs and flows. In the pending interstate cases related to
these conflicts, the Court will have to address whether the Georgia v. Russia (II) standard is
limited to the very specific facts of the short war between Georgia and Russia, or if it has a
wider application. If it is limited, the Court will need to explain how this standard fits with its
prior as well as forthcoming judgments on jurisdiction during armed conflicts (concurring
op., Keller, J., para. 25).
Arguably, the Court sought to draw a line beyond which the ECHR is no longer applicable.
But if so, the line is a blurry one. Clearly the Court did not wish to get involved in the chaos of
active armed conflicts. It is, however, unclear what that category encompasses. The Court’s
definition is narrower than the definition of Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions,
which also explicitly includes occupation. The Court instead came up with a sui generis def-
inition that is closely linked to the facts of this case. In the war between Georgia and Russia,
the active phase of hostilities is relatively easy to distinguish. Butmany conflicts carry on with-
out any formal resolution, and even formal ceasefires do not always put an end to actual hos-
tilities. Does the Court mean that the Convention is not going to be applicable for the entire
duration of such conflict, even if they continue for years? Is this principle only applicable to
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lawful acts of war and not to the de facto military confrontations? The judgment in Georgia
v. Russia (II) offers no answers.
The Court’s reasoning is also inconsistent with its own institutional practices. For example,
the Court can issue interimmeasures in interstate cases originating in armed conflicts and has
done so recently.11 Interim measures are provided by Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to
address circumstances presenting an immediate risk of potential human rights violations.
Isabella Risini has rightly asked what point interim measures serve if the Court has no juris-
diction over the periods of active hostilities.12 Similarly, the Court’s fact-finding mission in
Georgia v. Russia (II) investigated the active stage of hostilities, demonstrating that it was at
least not clear to the Court from the beginning that Russia had no jurisdiction over the events
between August 8–12, 2008. Even the decision on admissibility in Georgia v. Russia (II) that
the ECtHR delivered in 2011 did not suggest that the active stage of hostilities is partially
excluded from Russia’s jurisdiction.13
Another significant consequence of this case is that it implies that the Court may be willing
to give up on widespread human rights violations because they are too difficult to deal with.
The majority effectively makes a statement to that effect at paragraph 141 of the judgment,
quoted above. In response, the dissenting Judges Yudkivska, Wojtyczek, and Chanturia
pointed out:
We are simply astonished by these arguments. In our view, the role of this Court consists
precisely in dealing in priority with difficult cases characterised by “the large number of
alleged victims and contested incidents, the magnitude of the evidence produced, the
difficulty in establishing the relevant circumstances.”14
A court designed to be a bulwark against totalitarianism and war is here deciding not to deal
with human rights violations because they are too complex and demanding. One might argue
that the Court is thus denying justice to multiple victims of violations of the most fundamen-
tal human rights as a matter of convenience. If the ECtHR goes further in this direction and
decides that conflicts like those in Eastern Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh also do not fall
within jurisdiction of the contracting parties to the Convention due to their complexity, the
Court will deny justice to multiple victims of violations of the most fundamental human
rights.
As several dissenting judges pointed out, the ECtHR in Georgia v. Russia (II) has arguably
ruptured European public order. The Court’s references to this notion usually mean that it
does not allow gaps in human rights protection within the Convention space. “European
Public Order is used as the border guard of the Convention which ensures that it is effective
within the boundaries of the Council of Europe and does not spread outside them without
11 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Can the European Court of Human Rights Prevent War? Interim Measures in Inter-
state Cases, PUB. L. 254 (2016); Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Catch 22: The Interim Measures of the European Court of
Human Rights in the Conflict Between Armenia and Azerbaijan, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Oct. 9, 2020), at https://
strasbourgobservers.com/2020/10/09/catch-22-the-interim-measures-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-
in-the-conflict-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan; Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Vassilis Tzevelekos, Interim
Measures: Are Some Opportunities Worth Missing?, __ EUR. CONV. HUM. RTS. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021).
12 Isabella Risini, Human Rights in the Line of Fire: Georgia v. Russia (II) Before the European Court of Human
Rights, VERFBLOG (Jan. 28, 2021), at https://verfassungsblog.de/human-rights-in-the-line-of-fire.
13 Georgia v. Russia (II) [GC], Admissibility, App. No. 38263/08 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Dec. 13, 2011).
14 Id., partly diss. op., Yudkivska, Wojtyczeck, Chanturia, JJ., para 9.
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good reason.”15 Prior to this judgment, the Court would always find a party responsible for
human rights violations if these violations happened within the Convention’s territorial
space. Yet, here, the ECtHR failed to establish jurisdiction in relation to people living on a
territory who would otherwise be protected by the Convention. The Court’s solution to
the problem of jurisdiction in this case does not sit well with either its previous case law or




European Convention onHuman Rights—right to life—extraterritorial assassinations—prohibition
of discrimination—hate crimes—pardons and impunity—attribution of conduct not committed
in official capacity—attribution of conduct on the basis of state acknowledgment and adoption
MAKUCHYAN AND MINASYAN V. AZERBAIJAN AND HUNGARY. App. No. 17247/13. At https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int.
European Court of Human Rights, May 26, 2020.
The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) inMakuchyan
and Minasyan v. Azerbaijan and Hungary is remarkable both on account of its facts and the
peculiar legal issues it raised. In 2004, an ax-wielding Azerbaijani army officer (R.S.) beheaded
one Armenian officer, and attempted to kill another, while attending a NATO-organized
English language course in Budapest, Hungary. R.S. was prosecuted in Hungary and given
a life sentence. Eight years later, R.S. was transferred to Azerbaijan to serve the remainder of
his sentence. However, upon his arrival, R.S. received a hero’s welcome. He was released,
pardoned, promoted, and awarded salary arrears for the period spent in prison, as well as
the use of a state apartment in the capital. Many high-ranking Azerbaijani officials expressed
their approval of R.S.’s conduct and pardon. (The long-standing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan of course looms in the background of this story.)1
The applicants before the European Court were the surviving Armenian soldier and a rel-
ative of the slain soldier. They complained that Azerbaijan violated Article 2 (right to life) of
the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention),2 in both its substantive and pro-
cedural aspects: the former because the killer was a soldier in the Azerbaijani military and thus
a state agent; the latter because the state released him from prison. The applicants additionally
claimed a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), read together with the right
to life, alleging that R.S.’s attack and his release were both motivated by anti-Armenian ani-
mus. Finally, the applicants complained that Hungary also violated the procedural limb of
15 KANSTANTSIN DZEHTSIAROU, CAN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS SHAPE EUROPEAN PUBLIC ORDER
(forthcoming 2021).
1 The European Court has dealt with aspects of that conflict in Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], App. No.
13216/05 (2015) and Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], App. No. 40167/06 (2015), and is considering several inter-
state cases regarding the outbreak of the conflict in 2020.
2 European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5, 213 UNTS 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
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